Criminal Investigation and Legal Defense Mechanisms: Expert Analysis
The Rishon LeZion Magistrate’s Court rejected the police’s request to extend restrictive conditions on Prime Minister’s advisor Yonatan…
Despite the sudden illness of former Supreme Court Chief Justice Asher Grunis last week, the State Commission on Inquiry into the circumstances surrounding the procurement of German submarines and other military vessels, chaired by him, has published its conclusions. The primary conclusion: chaos in decision-making processes threatens the country’s security. Ad hoc decisions instead of a unified strategy, absence of a comprehensive picture of the armed forces’ needs, and lack of a clear accountability system in decision-making – all raise serious concerns about the mechanisms for making critically important state decisions.
Let’s start by trying to summarize the commission’s findings. What were its main conclusions?
Let me begin by noting that the commission presented a partial report. It’s very extensive and covers many issues, but two critical aspects are not included.
The first is the criminal investigation, which falls outside the commission’s jurisdiction. Who took bribes, who committed fraud? These are separate matters being examined within criminal proceedings.
The second is personal recommendations. These will be presented later. What we have today are exclusively institutional recommendations – fundamental recommendations on decision-making processes and procedures that exist in the military, the Ministry of Defense, and the Prime Minister’s Office.
There are recommendations about what various military organizations, the Ministry of Defense, the National Security Council, and the government should do. The main finding is that the work was conducted incorrectly, decisions were made chaotically, without proper coordination. In some cases, people without the necessary authority and expertise were making critically important decisions. In other cases, the decisions were contradictory. The commission has systematized exactly what needs to be done on these issues.

What specific prohibitions and restrictions does the commission impose?
A critically important prohibition concerns the National Security Council. It is forbidden from engaging in contacts with commercial organizations. The Council was not created for this purpose. There are specialized bodies within the Ministry of Defense that should handle these matters.
The same applies to military officers. They cannot conduct commercial entities on such matters. There’s a conflict of interest here and a lack of necessary expertise. This should be handled by the Ministry of Defense through established channels.
A very important issue the commission addressed was Israel’s consent to sale of similar submarines to Egypt. The commission made recommendations that such strategic matters must be decided in an organized manner, taking into account various aspects of national security, and such decisions must be documented to avoid harming the national security.
The commission’s main conclusion is unequivocal: decisions were made incorrectly, and Israel’s security has been harmed.
One aspect of the report concerns criticism of a situation where political leadership and civilian structures are unable to verify or challenge military positions on “binyan koach” (force building and procurement of military technology). Both the Security Cabinet and the Ministry of Defense are criticized, and particularly harsh criticism is directed at the National Security Council, which, in the commission’s view, failed in its primary mission to be a civilian alternative to military opinion. The commission even recommends creating an additional committee to perform part of its functions. As someone with experience as legal advisor to Israel’s National Security Council, do you believe the idea of creating such an organization as a copy of the American model didn’t work in our reality, or are we dealing with problems that can be solved?
The problem can be solved. The question is what’s needed to do so and how to do it.
When the National Security Council was created, the model was indeed the American National Security Council. It’s an apparatus attached to the president that coordinates various aspects of work in defense, security, and foreign policy.
Our Council was meant to be an instrument for the government, for the ministerial committee on national security, for the Prime Minister. It was supposed to be a coordinating body, not military, not part of the Ministry of Defense apparatus.
The Council was supposed to provide an independent perspective, analyze the recommendations and proposals of the army and Ministry of Defense, so that based on this analysis, the government and Cabinet could make informed decisions.
The fact that this isn’t happening means the National Security Council is not fulfilling one of its primary roles for which it was created. Instead, as the report indicates, the head of the National Security Council and other staff members engaged in contacts with Germans regarding commercial deals. This is not their function.
In June 2024, the commission issued five personal warnings to senior officials: Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu, former Defense Minister Bogie Ya’alon, Mossad chief Yossi Cohen, the then-head of the National Security Council, and other officials. The commission warned Netanyahu that he could be found guilty of damaging state security and systematically undermining work processes. The Prime Minister’s response was that he acted within his authority as head of government. Do you think that when it comes to personal recommendations, the commission will agree with his position and will not assign him personal responsibility?
I think that after such institutional recommendations, personal responsibility will be assigned.
The commission concluded that processes were violated, very seriously and in many areas, from Navy command to the Government level. Someone must bear responsibility for this.
The Prime Minister is one of those directly involved in these matters. No one is saying he took bribes. But the fact that he didn’t organize processes properly, that the decisions made resulted in damage to the state’s defense capability – this is a fact.
There were active wrong decisions: approval of procurement parameters, authorization for the sale to Egypt. And there was lack of decisions – no policy for defense resource development was created at the government level, at the Cabinet level. This is primarily the Prime Minister’s responsibility, because he is the one who should initiate the creation of such a strategy.
Furthermore, the Prime Minister directly supervises the National Security Council. The Council is located in his office and reports directly to him. The entire chain of decision-making and lack of decision-making in this sphere is his direct area of responsibility.
The Prime Minister bears less personal and ministerial responsibility regarding processes within IDF command and the Ministry of Defense, although there too he has responsibility. He’s at the top, he’s responsible for everything. But there, there’s a Defense Minister with his own responsibility.
However, regarding what happens inside the government apparatus and the National Security Council, this is primarily the Prime Minister’s responsibility. Moreover, the Prime Minister was directly involved in making specific decisions that the commission defined as incorrect, wrong, and damaging to the state’s defense capability.
We remember that simultaneously with this commission’s work, there’s a criminal trial related to the procurement of German vessels, the so-called “Case 3000,” which has somewhat receded from public attention. Could you tell us where this case stands now, who is the main defendant, and what are the prospects for this trial?
Two of the defendants reached plea agreements with the prosecution, and court sentences were handed down in their cases, particularly regarding former minister Modi Zandberg.
The remaining cases are still ongoing. Currently, proceedings continue against Miki Ganor, who was a consultant, Avraham Bar-Yosef, who was deputy head of the National Security Council, and several other officials and consultants. As far as I know, there are three or four cases in progress.
The cases are in court, and we need to await a judicial decision on this matter.